In Bombori, a village in central Mali’s Mopti region, July 10 brought violence into ordinary homes. Africa Corps fighters killed nine people there, including four children, and burned houses, according to Human Rights Watch. For the families who survived, the Russian-backed forces deployed to fight insurgents have become a source of the very insecurity they were sent to end.
That experience sits at the heart of a larger story playing out this week in Moscow, where African leaders are gathering for the third Russia-Africa summit. President Vladimir Putin will cochair Thursday’s plenary session with Burundian President Evariste Ndayishimiye, the current chair of the African Union. A two-day economic and humanitarian forum will run alongside, covering investment, industrial production, food security, energy, technology and payment systems, with a new plan for 2027-2029 promising what organisers call “mutually beneficial cooperation”.
The record so far tells a different story for the people these agreements are meant to serve. At the previous summit in St Petersburg in July 2023, Russia and African governments signed 161 accords and adopted a 2023-2026 action plan. The Sochi summit in October 2019 had produced 92 agreements, and Putin pledged to double annual trade to $40bn. Yet as the current plan nears its conclusion, Russian trade statistics show merchandise trade with Africa reached just $27.1bn in 2025. The imbalance has continued into 2026: Russia exported $14bn in goods to Africa during the first eight months of the year while importing only $3.2bn.
Wheat shipments illustrate the pattern. In the first half of 2026, Russia shipped 10.2 million tonnes of wheat to Africa, with Egypt its largest agricultural customer. The supplies meet real food needs, but exports of wheat and fertiliser benefit Russian producers far more than they build African industry.
Investment promises have fared no better. At the 2019 summit, fertiliser producer Uralchem and Angola’s Grupo Opaia agreed to build a $1.2bn ammonia and urea complex, scheduled to begin production in 2023. Uralchem abandoned the venture that year. Egypt offers the clearest evidence of progress: Rosatom is building four nuclear reactors at El Dabaa, employing more than 18,000 Egyptians in their construction. But the project is financed largely through a $25bn Russian loan that Egypt must repay with interest.
Where projects do advance, contract terms decide who benefits. In the Republic of Congo, a proposed petroleum-products pipeline between Pointe-Noire and Brazzaville would give Russian interests 90 percent of the joint venture and Congo’s state oil company 10 percent, under a 25-year concession with guaranteed transport tariffs. Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak said in April that design work would begin this year, with operations planned for 2029. Russian officials have described the pipeline as a way of protecting petroleum exports from Western sanctions imposed after Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The military footprint is widening alongside the commercial one. On October 8, Sweden’s Defence Research Agency identified at least 57 Russian military and security agreements involving 39 African countries, though many remain limited in practice. Russia first relied on the Wagner Group, a Kremlin-linked mercenary network, before shifting many operations to the Ministry of Defence-controlled Africa Corps, with Wagner still active in the Central African Republic.
Mali shows the limits of that assistance. Wagner fighters and Malian troops captured the northern city of Kidal in November 2023, lost it to separatist rebels in April 2026, and regained it on October 6 after an air campaign prompted the rebels to withdraw. Territory has changed hands; dependable security has not arrived. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project recorded 49 air strikes by Malian forces and the Africa Corps from April to August, killing 89 civilians. Detainees held at a military base in Sevare from May to August endured beatings, electric shocks and waterboarding.
Meanwhile, Moscow has proved its value to allied rulers. On August 29, the Africa Corps helped General Abdourahamane Tiani crush a mutiny in Niger, providing ground and aerial support in a role Moscow’s ambassador confirmed. Nigeriens remain without political parties or an election timetable, and the junta stripped five more exiled critics of their nationality on September 17. In the Central African Republic, Russian forces have helped President Faustin-Archange Touadera, in power for 10 years, secure a third term in December’s election despite an opposition boycott. For continued protection, Moscow reportedly demanded close to 14 million euros ($15.7m) a month to deploy Africa Corps in place of Wagner, while Russian-linked companies continued profiting from the country’s gold.
The influence campaign extends to information itself. In July, Russia’s state broadcaster RT signed a content-sharing agreement with Tafouk TV, a channel run by the military governments of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso that broadcasts from Bamako and promotes official successes while overlooking insurgent attacks. An April 3 investigation by France 24 uncovered nearly 650 pro-Russian articles placed in 35 West African media outlets from June to October 2024, with leaked documents listing payments of $250 to $700 per article. In Angola, a court in July convicted two Russians tied to the Africa Politology network of terrorism and espionage, sentencing Igor Ratchin to 11 years and Lev Lakshtanov to eight; both denied the charges and appealed.
For ordinary Africans, the pattern is consistent: insecurity, repression and unfulfilled development commitments, while Moscow gains preferential access to mineral resources and protects illiberal rulers. As leaders meet in Moscow, the measure of partnership will be whether it delivers fair trade, productive investment and accountability for civilian abuses, or simply another round of promises on paper.