Rusal has a way back into alumina. The Russian aluminium producer signed an agreement with Ghana’s state-owned Ghana Integrated Aluminium Development Corporation (GIADEC) on October 29 in Moscow, on the sidelines of the third Russia-Africa Summit, to develop a bauxite mine and an alumina refinery. The structure gives Rusal majority ownership of two joint ventures; GIADEC retains minority interests, including a 10% non-dilutable stake.
The commercial logic is straightforward for the company. Rusal lost access to alumina sources in Ukraine and Australia in 2022, and the Ghanaian projects offer a route to rebuilding that supply chain. West Africa is familiar ground, since it already runs bauxite mines and an alumina refinery in Guinea. The proposed mine at Nyinahin, in Ghana’s Ashanti Region, could produce up to five million metric tons of bauxite annually, according to the company, with the refinery adding capacity for 1.2 million metric tons of alumina a year.
Ghana’s interest lies in moving beyond raw ore exports. The country wants domestic refining and manufacturing capacity, and GIADEC says the projects could create jobs and support improvements to rail and port infrastructure. Yet the ownership split raises a harder question: how much economic value Ghana actually retains. No investment commitments or details of local participation have been disclosed.
The summit provided the backdrop. Delegations from 48 African countries gathered to discuss trade, investment, energy and security cooperation with Russia, and analysts suggest the broader Russian economic offer on the continent remains thin. Gustavo de Carvalho, acting Head of the African Governance and Diplomacy Programme at the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), tells FORBES AFRICA that Russia sells Africa wheat, fertilizer, arms and nuclear technology but buys very little back. Russian companies, he adds, also lack the state-backed finance that Chinese, Gulf or European investors bring.
Sanctions and payment difficulties have made trade harder, according to de Carvalho, although Russia’s investment presence in Africa was limited even before the war in Ukraine. He notes that African governments engage with Moscow where it has something specific to offer, rather than relying on it alone. Egypt’s El Dabaa nuclear power plant, under construction and financed by a $25 billion Russian loan, is one project that has gone ahead. Many other Russian nuclear agreements with African countries remain at the memorandum stage.
The trade figures underline the challenge. Russian goods trade with Africa fell 2.4% in 2025, according to Federal Customs Service figures reported by Interfax, even as Moscow aims to expand commercial ties with the continent. At the summit, Ghanaian President John Dramani Mahama called for better access to Russian markets for African exports, improved payment arrangements and greater investment in local processing and manufacturing.
Other announcements carried a similar pattern. Mali signed mining cooperation agreements with Russia’s Rosgeologiya, and Rosatom agreed a nuclear energy cooperation roadmap with Uganda that provides for assessments of Uganda’s nuclear infrastructure but stops short of a construction or financing contract. Rosatom also announced long-term contracts to supply enriched uranium products to South Africa.
For de Carvalho, the real test is not the number of documents signed but, as he puts it, “whether any come with financing, timelines and African equity attached.” That standard applies directly to the Rusal-Ghana ventures, where the ownership structure is settled but the financial commitments underpinning it have yet to be spelled out.