Israel’s October 27 election will be watched across Africa less for its politics than for what it means for a web of agreements, embassies and cooperation projects that governments from Rabat to Lusaka have spent years putting in place. Neither Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud-led coalition nor the Jewish-led opposition bloc is projected to secure the 61 seats needed for a majority in the 120-seat Knesset. The vote could therefore test whether the practical machinery of Israel’s African partnerships survives the fallout from the war on Gaza.
The most concrete delivery commitments on the table are Moroccan. On September 16, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar and Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita met in New York at a trilateral summit hosted by US Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz. The three countries reaffirmed plans to upgrade diplomatic relations, elevate their missions to embassies and appoint ambassadors. They also agreed to conclude investment protection and double taxation agreements by the end of this year, expand flights to include Moroccan airlines, and arrange reciprocal high-level visits in the coming months. These were announced commitments rather than confirmation that the changes had already been implemented. The election outcome will determine whether the timetable holds.
Morocco restored relations with Israel in 2020 under a US-backed arrangement linked to Washington’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. Despite public demonstrations opposing normalisation, Rabat has continued to pursue closer ties, making it the clearest case of delivery continuing alongside diplomatic strain.
Elsewhere, the operational picture is more uneven. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, President Felix Tshisekedi visited Israel on August 31 and September 1, meeting Netanyahu and President Isaac Herzog. Discussions covered security, defence, agriculture, infrastructure, energy and high technology, and both sides expressed a desire to strengthen their strategic partnership. The visit followed memorandums of understanding signed on July 27, which Congolese officials said would be reviewed with a view to further Israeli investment, including opportunities linked to the Lobito Corridor. The meetings show the potential scope of bilateral cooperation but do not establish that a specific new security contract has been concluded.
Zambia offers another example of institutional delivery. Israel opened a resident embassy in Lusaka in August last year after a 52-year absence, identifying agriculture, water management, health, education and technology as areas for closer cooperation. Some analysts have read the move as an attempt to cultivate partners who could counterbalance South Africa’s influence in the region, though that remains an interpretation rather than an established explanation, and Zambia has its own reasons for seeking investment.
South Africa, by contrast, has pursued a different track. Since the war began in October 2023 it has been one of Israel’s most vocal critics on the continent, bringing a case at the International Court of Justice alleging violations of the 1948 Genocide Convention, which Israel rejects. The court’s provisional measures in 2024, including an order for Israel to act to prevent acts of genocide, are not a final ruling. In November 2023, South Africa’s National Assembly adopted a motion calling for the Israeli embassy to be closed and relations suspended, though the motion did not itself implement those measures. Professor Iwebunor Okwechime of Obafemi Awolowo University traces the stance to the apartheid era, when Israel backed the apartheid regime, and told Al Jazeera, “There won’t be a radical change in sentiments regardless of the government in power.”
Implementation has also stalled at the continental level. In 2021 the African Union Commission chairperson accredited Israel’s representative, prompting objections from member states. In February 2022 the AU Assembly set up a committee of heads of state to consult on Israel’s observer status, and in 2023 the AU moved to suspend the accreditation pending further consideration.
The limits of Israel’s outreach were evident after it recognised Somaliland on December 26 last year, the first country to do so. Somalia rejected the move, and President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud told Al Jazeera this month that Somalia will not accept Israeli presence “under any circumstances”, adding that Israel planned a naval base in Berbera and use of the city’s airport. According to ACLED, 110 demonstrations linked to the recognition had been recorded by its February 2026 Africa overview, only seven of them supportive, all in Somaliland.
For Idowu Johnson of the University of Ibadan, the October 27 election will be pivotal because a new government’s stance on the Palestinian cause will shape how far Africa cooperates on agriculture, trade, security and technology. Hossamaldeen Ibrahim of the Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute argues the next government could either deepen strategic cooperation in Morocco, Sudan and the Red Sea, or face a legitimacy problem if its policies remain tied to the Gaza war. As coverage of the vote continues across the continent, as reflected in reporting at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/10/15/from-morocco-to-south-africa-israel-election-watched-closely-across-africa, the question for implementers on both sides is whether announced projects, embassies and agreements convert into working partnerships or stall in the gap between state-level cooperation and public sentiment.